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Summary
On November 13, 2001, President Bush signed a Military Order pertaining to the
detention, treatment, and trial of certain non-citizens as part of the war against
terrorism.  The order makes clear that the President views the crisis that began on the
morning of September 11 as an attack “on a scale that has created a state of armed
conflict that requires the use of the United States Armed Forces.”  The order finds
that the effective conduct of military operations and prevention of military attacks
make it necessary to detain certain non-citizens and if necessary, to try them “for
violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunals.”
The unprecedented nature of the September attacks and the magnitude of
damage and loss of life they caused have led a number of officials and commentators
to assert that the acts are not just criminal acts, they are “acts of war.”   The
President’s Military Order makes it apparent that he plans to treat the attacks as acts
of war rather than criminal acts.  The distinction may have more than rhetorical
significance.  Treating the attacks as violations of the international law of war could
allow the United States to prosecute those responsible as war criminals, trying them
by special military commission rather than in federal court.  
The purpose of this report is to identify some of the legal and practical
implications of treating the terrorist acts as war crimes and of applying the law of war
rather than criminal statutes to prosecute the alleged perpetrators.  The report will
first present an outline of the sources and principles of the law of war, including a
discussion of whether and how it might apply to the current terrorist crisis.   A brief
explanation of the background issues and arguments surrounding the use of military
commissions will follow. The report will then explore the legal bases and implications
of applying the law of war under United States law, summarize precedent for its
application by military commissions, and provide an analysis of the President’s
Military Order of November 13, 2001.  Finally, the report discusses considerations for
establishing rules of procedure and evidence that comport with international
standards.
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1 This report supercedes Trying Terrorists as War Criminals, RS21056 (Oct.  29, 2001), a
summary treatment of the military tribunal issue prepared prior to the issuance of President
Bush’s Order of November 13.
2 Military Order, November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, §1(a), 66 Fed.  Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).  See
Appendix.
3 Id. § 1(e).
4 See Terrorism at Home and Abroad: Applicable Federal and State Laws, CRS Report 95-
1050 (updated Sept. 24, 2001).
5 Sheik Omar Abdel Rahmen was convicted, along with several of his followers, for seditious
conspiracy to levy war against the United States in connection with the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing and other plans to commit urban terrorism.  See United States v. Rahman,
189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999), cert.  denied  528 U.S. 1094 (2000).  The perpetrators of the
embassy bombings in Africa were prosecuted for murder and other charges in federal court.
See United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F.Supp.2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  
6 See Philip Allen Lacovara, Criminal or Military Justice for Captured Terrorists?, 10 N.J.
LAW. 7 ( 2001).
Terrorism and the Law of War: 
Trying Terrorists as War Criminals 
before Military Commissions
Introduction1
On November 13, 2001, President Bush signed a Military Order pertaining to the
detention, treatment, and trial of certain non-citizens as part of the war against
terrorism.  The order makes clear that the President views the crisis that began on the
morning of September 11 as an attack “on a scale that has created a state of armed
conflict that requires the use of the United States Armed Forces.”2   The order finds
that the effective conduct of military operations and prevention of military attacks
make it necessary to detain certain non-citizens and if necessary, to try them “for
violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunals.”3
The September 11 attacks clearly violated numerous laws4 and may be
prosecuted as criminal acts, as past terrorist acts have been prosecuted in the United
States.5  The unprecedented nature of the September attacks and the magnitude of
damage and loss of life they caused have led a number of officials and commentators
to assert that the acts are not just criminal acts, they are “acts of war.”6   The
President’s Order makes it apparent that he plans to treat the attacks as acts of war
rather than criminal acts.  The distinction may have more than rhetorical significance.
Treating the attacks as violations of the international law of war could allow the
CRS-2
7 See LT. COL. RICHARD J. ERICKSON, LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATE-
SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 63-65 (1989).
8 See id. (describing arguments against invoking law of war against terrorists); Michael P.
Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peace Time Equivalent of War Crimes: A Case of Too
Much Convergence Between International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal
Law?, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 391 (2001) (arguing that treating terrorists according to
the law of war would enable them to target government facilities, invoke the defense of
obedience to orders, and claim prisoner-of-war status.).
9 See THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 70 (Dieter Fleck, ed.
1995)(hereinafter “HANDBOOK”)(noting that for groups to qualify as “armed forces,” they
must have a responsible command and an internal disciplinary system to ensure members’
compliance with the law of war).
10 See Spencer J. Crona and Niel A. Richardson, Justice for War Criminals of Invisible
Armies: A New Legal and Military Approach to Terrorism, 21 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 349
(1996).
11 See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 19 (Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, eds.
2000)(hereinafter “DOCUMENTS”)(explaining that the laws of war are applicable and binding
upon individuals who bear direct responsibility for the commission of a crime, including those
who order, induce, or facilitate it). 
12 See ERICKSON, supra note 7, at 79-80.
United States to prosecute those responsible as war criminals, trying them by special
military commission rather than in federal court.
The purpose of this report is to identify some of the legal and practical
implications of treating the terrorist acts as war crimes and of applying the law of war
rather than criminal statutes to prosecute the alleged perpetrators.  The report will
first present an outline of the sources and principles of the law of war, including a
discussion of whether and how it might apply to the current terrorist crisis.  A brief
explanation of the background issues and arguments surrounding the use of military
commissions will follow. The report will then explore the legal bases and implications
of applying the law of war under United States law and precedent for its application
by military commissions. The report will conclude with an analysis of the President’s
Military Order of November 13, 2001. 
Background
Some observers have expressed concern that treating terrorist acts as acts of war
may legitimize the acts as a lawful use of force and elevate the status of the
perpetrators and terrorist networks to that of legitimate state actors and lawful
combatants.7 However, it may be argued that an application of the law of war to
terrorism does not imply lawfulness of the conflict, nor does it imply that perpetrators
are not criminals.8  Terrorists are not members of armed forces for the purpose of the
law of war9 and do not, by definition, conduct themselves as lawful combatants.10
Under this view, those who participate directly in unlawful acts of war, including
those with command influence,11 may be treated as war criminals and if captured, are
not entitled to prisoner-of-war (POW) status under the Geneva Conventions.12  As
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13 See Adam Roberts, Implementation of the Laws of War in Late-Twentieth-Century
Conflicts, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 359, 365 (Schmitt
and Green, eds. 1998)(noting that while international tribunals for enforcing the law of war
have received more attention, the overwhelming number of trials have occurred at the national
level).
14  See Louis Jacobson and Gia Fenoglio, How Would They Be Tried?  33 NAT’L J. 3350
(Oct.  27, 2001).
15  See Daniel M. Filler, Values We can Afford – Protecting Constitutional Rights in an Age
of Terrorism: An Answer to Crona and Richardson, 21 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 409, 419-20
(1999). 
16  Military jurisdiction in occupied areas is well established, even for ordinary crimes, as a
power necessary for military government.  See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). The
commander also has the option of detaining offenders until they can be delivered to civil
authorities for trial.  See Gallagher v. United States, 423 F.2d 1371 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
17  See Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (granting writ of habeas corpus to
civilian convicted by military commission for criminal offenses and violations of the law of
war where federal courts were available and defendant was not affiliated with enemy armed
(continued...)
suspected war criminals, they may be tried by any nation in its national courts or by
a military commission convened by one nation or many.13
Under the terms of the President’s Military Order of November 13,  the
President has the option to order the trial of accused terrorists, whether captured
overseas or on U.S. territory, by military commission.   It is argued by some that it
would be unworkable, for instance, to try Osama bin Laden in federal court under
established rules of procedure and evidence.  A public trial, some argue, could be used
to the terrorists’ advantage by allowing them to force the government to release
sensitive information.  A  trial of suspected terrorists could also become an
“international media circus,” raising possible concerns for the safety of judge and
jurors.14  Such a trial could be lengthy and subject to multiple appeals, during which
a conviction could be overturned on a technicality.  It might be impossible to empanel
an impartial jury anywhere within the United States, some observers have argued.
Observers have expressed concern that invoking the law of war against terrorists
in this instance could lead to the use of a similar approach to combat other societal
ills upon which rhetorical “wars” might be declared.15  This tactic, they argue, could
allow the government to establish military tribunals to try drug dealers, for example,
without ordinary due process of law.  Other opponents of using military commissions
argue that secret trials could deny due process and that the resulting verdicts would
lack legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.
A review of legal precedents indicates that the authority of the Commander in
Chief to try war criminals in occupied territory is well settled.  Similarly, there is
substantial precedent for establishing military tribunals to try enemy belligerents who
are charged with violating the law of war, especially individuals captured overseas.16
Determining who qualifies as an “enemy belligerent” for acts committed on U.S.




18  18 U.S.C. § 1853.  See The Posse Comitatus Act & Related Matters: The Use of the
Military to Execute Civilian Law, CRS Report 95-964 S (updated June 1, 2000).
19  See 50 U.S.C. § 21 (defining “enemy” as all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the
hostile nation or government, being of the age of fourteen years and upward, who shall be
within the United States and not actually naturalized”).
20  See HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 41 (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287)(GC IV).  Enemy aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict who are
charged with offenses must be treated in accordance with GC IV art. 76, which provides for
conditions of detention at least equal to those of normal imprisonment, sanitary conditions and
proper medical attention, and detainees have the right to maintain contact with the outside
world.  See HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 278 and 284.
21  50 U.S.C. § 21.
22  Civil actions brought under 18 U.S.C. §2333 (terrorism remedies) may not be maintained
for acts of war.  18 U.S.C. §2335.  Defendants convicted under criminal proceedings are
(continued...)
President’s order appears to be broader than the authority cited by previous
Presidents, and may cover aliens in the United States legally who are  citizens of
countries with which the nation is at peace.  It may also be seen as conflicting with
certain acts of Congress.
Ancillary Issues.
The President’s order raises some possible related considerations.  For example,
section 1(d) of the order finds that the United States’ ability to protect itself and its
citizens depends upon using the United States Armed Forces to “identify terrorists
and those who support them, to disrupt their activities and to eliminate their ability
to conduct or support such attacks.” Does this finding authorize the military police
to investigate certain crimes, possibly implicating the Posse Comitatus Act, which
restricts use of the military to enforce civilian law?18 When civilian police are involved
in terrorism investigations,  must they follow the same standards that they apply to
criminal cases?  The use of military tribunals may also affect the United States’ ability
to extradite terrorist suspects captured abroad. 
  The order may also affect the rights and treatment of aliens.  Because the
current state of hostilities does not involve an enemy foreign state as such, the status
of an alien as an “enemy alien” cannot be determined according to citizenship.19  The
question may arise as to whether aliens subject to the order may be treated as enemy
aliens, in which case the law of war may permit their internment but would also entitle
them to the protections of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV.20  Under U.S. law, their
detention may be authorizable only in accordance with the Enemy Alien Act.21
Such an approach could also have an impact on available remedies for victims.
Will there be any effect on the possible civil liability of terrorists to compensate
victims?22  Would it matter if a particular victim was a government employee or
CRS-5
22(...continued)
estopped from denying responsibility in any subsequent civil suit.  18 U.S.C. §2333(b).
Under current law, it is unclear whether a conviction by military commission could be invoked
in this way.
23  See Insurance Exclusion Clauses and Coverage of the Events of September 11, CRS
Report RL31166 (Oct.  20, 2001).
24 See DOCUMENTS, supra note 11, at 2; Georgios Petrochilos, The Relevance of the Concepts
of War and Armed Conflict to the Law of Neutrality, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 575, 577-
78 (1998)(commenting on changes to law of war).
25 See DOCUMENTS, supra note11, at 1-2.
26  See id. at 1; CIVILIANS IN WAR (Simon Chesterman ed., 2001) 15-16 (explaining that
theories of “just war” were to be kept out of jus in bello in part to make it easier to maintain
legal parity between parties, holding both sides to same rules of conduct).
27  The reference to humanitarian responsibilities represents a change in focus from the rights
and duties of combatants to an emphasis on belligerents’ responsibility to protect civilians.
See G.I.A.D. Draper, Humanitarianism in the Modern Law of Armed Conflicts, in ARMED
CONFLICT AND THE NEW LAW (Michael A.  Meyer, ed.  1989).
someone located at a “military target” at the time of an attack?  Will there be an effect
on the liability of insurers?23  A decision to adopt a law of war approach to the
terrorist acts currently at issue, or to future acts of international terror, could also
have significant foreign policy repercussions.
Sources and Principles of the Law of War
As a subset of the law of nations, the law of war is a composite of many sources
and is subject to varying interpretations constantly adjusting to address new
technology and the changing nature of war.24   It may also be referred to as jus in
bello, or law in war, which refers to the conduct of combatants in armed conflict, as
distinguished from jus ad bellum – law before war – which outlines acceptable
reasons for nations to engage in armed conflict.25  The rules overlap somewhat but
remain conceptually separate due to the cardinal principle that jus in bello applies to
both parties in a conflict, without regard to the lawfulness of the inception of the
conflict.26  In other words, the party “at fault” retains the rights and responsibilities
of the law of war, even if the armed conflict itself is unjustifiable under international
law.
The law of war is also sometimes known as the “law of armed conflict” or
“international humanitarian law” (IHL).27  The use of the terminology “armed
conflict” reflects the applicability of the law to undeclared wars, in recognition of the
reality that formal declarations of war may be largely a thing of the past.  The term
IHL is favored by some to emphasize the humanitarian purpose of the law, that is, to
protect civilians to the extent possible in the event jus ad bellum fails to prevent an
armed conflict.
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28  See DOCUMENTS, supra note 11, at 4 (enumerating sources of international law of war).
29 See id. at 7-8.
30 See Bartram S. Brown, Nationality and Internationality in International Humanitarian
Law, 34 STAN. J INT’L L. 347, 352 (1998) (citing Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded Armies in the Field, signed at Geneva, Aug. 22, 1864, 129
CONSOL. T.S. 361.).
31 Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 (hereinafter “Hague Regulation” or “HR”).
32  Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949 , 6 U.S.T. 3115; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3219; The Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, art. 118, 6
U.S.T. 3317 (hereinafter GC III); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, art. 6, 6 U.S.T.
3516 (hereinafter GC IV).
33 See Department of the Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, chapter 1, § 1 (1956)
(listing treaties pertinent to land warfare to which the United States is a party).
Sources.
Sources of the law of war include customary principles and rules of international
law, international agreements, judicial decisions by both national and international
tribunals, national manuals of military law, scholarly treatises, and resolutions of
various international bodies.28  Customary principles of international law apply
universally.29  Treaties bind only those parties to them, unless they are seen to codify
jus cogens principles, that is, have attained the common acceptance of nations.  The
other sources are generally treated not as binding sources of law, but rather as
evidence that rules and principles have attained the common acceptance of nations to
qualify as jus cogens norms.
The first attempt to codify the law of war is generally accepted to be the first
Geneva Convention of 1864.30 The process continued with the Hague Conventions
of 1899 and 1907 (also known as the “Law of The Hague”)31 and when the Geneva
Convention was revised and expanded into the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.32
The process has continued through the adoption of the additional protocols in 1977,
and augmented with related treaties such as the Genocide Convention.
The United States Army Field Manual (FM) 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare,
codifies the Army’s interpretation of the law of war, incorporating reference to
relevant conventions and rules of the customary law of war, as well as relevant
statutes.33
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34 See DOCUMENTS, supra note 11, at 9. 
35 See id. (summarizing principles found in military manuals of various nations).
36 See id. at 10. 
37 Protocol  I art. 56(1).  See HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, 2 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
304 (1998).
38 Protocol I art. 56(2).
39 See McCoubrey, supra note 37, at 304.
Principles.
The main thrust of the law of war requires that a military objective be pursued
in such a way as to avoid needless and disproportionate suffering and damages.34  At
the risk of oversimplifying the concept, three principles derived from the law of war
may be applied to assess the legality of any use of force for political objectives.35
Military Necessity.
The use of force must be proportional in relation to the anticipated military
advantage or as a measure of self-defense.  The principle applies to the choice of
targets, weapons and methods. This principle, however, does not apply to unlawful
acts of war.36  There can be no excuse of necessity if  the use of arms is not itself
justified.  In other words, military necessity can never be invoked to justify a breach
of jus ad bellum, and it may not be invoked to justify a use of arms if there is no valid
military advantage to be gained.  However, responsibility for “collateral damage” to
otherwise unlawful targets may sometimes be excused by military necessity.
Humanity.
Lawful combatants are bound to use force discriminately.  In other words, they
must limit their targets to valid military objectives and must use means no harsher than
necessary to achieve that objective.  They may not use methods designed to inflict
needless suffering, and they may not target civilians.  It is also unlawful to target
facilities such as nuclear power plants, whose destruction would unleash even more
destructive forces likely to cause unjustifiable civilian casualties and lasting
environmental damage.37 However, there is an exception if the facilities are used to
support “regular significant and direct military operations,”38 especially if the facilities
can be put out of production in such a way as to avoid unleashing disproportionately
destructive forces.39
Chivalry.
Combatants must adhere to the law of armed conflict in order to be treated as
lawful combatants.  They must respect the rights of prisoners of war and captured
civilians, and avoid behavior such as looting and pillaging.  They may not conceal
their arms and disguise themselves as non-combatants during battle or preparation for
an attack.  While a “ruse” may be permissible to maintain operational secrecy or
CRS-8
40 See FM 27-10 § 51.
41 See id. § 50.
42 See id. § 31(explaining that the rule prohibits assassination or outlawry of an enemy,  but
does not prohibit attack against an individual soldier or officer of the enemy by lawful means).
43 See Brown, supra note 30, at 352-53.
44 See id. at 353 (noting that war crimes are ultimately committed by people, making
individual criminal responsibility important to deter individuals from committing war crimes).
45  See BG Malham M. Wakin,  Applying Nuremberg Principles to Limited War, 6 USAFA
J. LEG. STUD. 169, 170 (1995 / 1996).
46  See id.  (explaining that the plea of following superior orders is not an adequate defense to
war crimes when the orders are clearly unlawful).
47 GC IV art. 33 provides:
No protected person may be punished for an offense he or she has not
personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of
intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited. 
48 See Daniel J. Steinbock, Interpreting the Refugee Definition, 45 UCLA L. REV. 733
(1998)(interpreting various conventions to accord everyone “the right of life, liberty, and
security of person, the right to recognition before the law, and the right to be free of arbitrary
arrest, detention, or execution”).
obtain information about the enemy,40 “perfidy”– lulling the adversary into believing
there is a situation  under which the law of war provides protection – is not allowed.41
An example of perfidious conduct is the waving of a white flag to indicate surrender
in order to ambush combatants.  It is also forbidden to “kill or wound treacherously”
enemy individuals.42
Responsibility.
The law of war had its origins when states were considered the only subjects of
international law.  Its original purpose was to define the rights and duties of states in
wartime to facilitate the determination of the legal responsibility of states for their
breaches.43 One of the more recent developments of the law of war is the notion of
individual responsibility for conduct in war.44  Each soldier is bound to obey the law
of war even if it means disobeying the direct order of a superior.45  Soldiers who obey
unlawful orders are responsible for the violation along with whoever ordered it.46
Conversely, responsibility for war crimes may not be imposed upon groups of
individuals based on an unlawful act committed by a member of the group.47  The
notion of individual responsibility and justice through individual trials necessarily
excludes the notion of collective guilt.48
Protection of Civilians and Prisoners of War.
Since the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the focus of the law of war has turned from
rules of engagement to the protection of individuals.  An individual’s status as
combatant or civilian is important for determining the forms of protection due under
international law.   Combatants are allowed to wage war but may also be attacked by
CRS-9
49 See L. Doswald-Beck, The Value of the 1977 Geneva Protocols for the Protection of
Civilians, in ARMED CONFLICT AND THE NEW LAW 137, 163 (Michael A. Meyer ed. 1989).
50 See GC III art. 102; FM 27-10 § 178 (b) provides the following interpretation under the
UCMJ:
Prisoners of war, including those accused of war crimes against whom judicial
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the enemy.  Civilians may not wage war, but unless and for so long as they directly
participate in hostilities, may not lawfully be attacked.49  
POW.
Members of the armed forces who fall into enemy hands during an armed conflict
are protected by GC III and are treated as POWs.  They may be interned under
humane treatment as provided by the Convention, but they may not be punished
unless convicted of a crime.  If a POW is to be punished for a crime, he must first be
convicted and sentenced by a court “according to the same procedure as in the case
of members of the armed forces of the detaining Power.”50  A POW  may be confined
awaiting trial for no longer than three months,51 and no trial can begin until three
weeks after the detaining Power has notified the prisoner’s representative and the
protecting Power of the charges on which the prisoner is to be tried, where the
prisoner is held, and where the trial will take place.52
Civilians.
Civilians who are citizens of a party to an armed conflict and fall into enemy
hands either by residing as aliens in the territory of an opposing party or through
capture by invading or occupying forces, are entitled to treatment in accordance with
GC IV.  They, too, may be interned if necessary but may not be punished unless
convicted of a crime by a regular tribunal practicing the generally recognized
principles of regular judicial procedure.53  
Civilians who take direct part in the hostilities and fall into the hands of the
adversary are treated as POWs until a competent tribunal determines that they
engaged in unlawful combat.54  A captive may not be prosecuted for unlawful
participation in hostilities unless such a determination has been made.55 Therefore,
even in the case of unlawful belligerents, it would seem the law of war no longer
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permits trial by military tribunal without ordinary due process merely on the
accusation that a person has engaged in unlawful combat.  
Spies and Saboteurs.
Spies and saboteurs do not receive the same protection.  A spy is one who, in
disguise or under false pretenses, penetrates into the zone of operations of a
belligerent to obtain information with the intent of communicating that information
to the hostile party.56  If captured, a spy may be tried and executed.57  However, if a
spy rejoins the army of the hostile party as a lawful combatant, he is no longer a spy
and is not subject to punishment for those acts if he later falls into the hands of the
enemy.58  Sending spies behind enemy lines is legal under the law of war.59  Spies are
not punished for criminal culpability so much as they are “deactivated” as a security
measure.  However, spies are entitled to a trial in accordance with the detaining
power’s applicable laws before they can be punished.60
Saboteurs, or enemy agents who penetrate into the territory of an adversary
without openly bearing arms in order to perpetrate hostile acts are subject to similar
treatment.61  However, such person is still a “protected person” for the purposes of
the Geneva Conventions,62 and is entitled to a fair and regular trial as prescribed.63 It
is unclear whether a saboteur retains the status of unlawful belligerent after rejoining
the lawful forces or whether he becomes a lawful combatant, immune from
punishment for the hostile acts.  If sabotage is treated in a similar manner as spying
during war, it may not be possible to characterize all “war criminals” as “unlawful
belligerents” who are not entitled to treatment as POWs. 
The Law of War Applied
The purpose of this section is to discuss the issues relative to whether the attacks
of September 11 may be considered “acts of war” under international law, and if so,
how those responsible might be treated under the law of war.  The law of war may be
applied only to acts that are part of an “armed conflict.”  A terrorist act is not seen to
be an act of war unless it is part of a broader campaign of violence directed against
the state.  Where terrorist acts amount to no more than “situations of internal
disturbances and tensions such as riots and isolated and sporadic acts of violence,” the
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Hague and Geneva Conventions do not apply.64  Instead, peacetime domestic criminal
laws and international conventions aimed at the repression of terrorism would come
into play, obligating states parties to the agreements to try or extradite those believed
responsible.65
Is There an “Armed Conflict”?
Because the terrorist organization allegedly behind the September attacks is not
a state under international law and its members are not uniformed soldiers of any
recognized army, there are conceptual difficulties in fitting their activities into the
rubric of the international law of war.66  There are two recognized types of armed
conflicts – international and internal.  An international armed conflict involves two or
more states,67 whereas an internal conflict involves a legitimate state engaged in
conflict with an armed group that has attained international personality.68
The nature of  “internal conflicts” remains a matter of some controversy.  While
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War
Victims (“Protocol I”)69 sought to extend coverage to non-international conflicts “in
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination,”  it is not
clear whether groups fighting for other causes were meant to be covered.70  At any
rate, the United States did not ratify Protocol I, arguing that to recognize as
combatants irregular groups – terrorists – would allow them to “enjoy many of the
benefits of the law of war without fulfilling its duties, and with the confidence that the
belligerent state has no real remedy under the Protocol to deal with this matter.”71  
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The use of force by private persons rather than organs of a state has not
traditionally constituted “armed conflict.”72  It has been suggested that the possible
involvement of the governments of foreign states may make international terrorism
an armed conflict for the purposes of the law of war.73 Some have maintained that
state support of terrorism is a violation of international law.74  On the other hand,
some jurists argue that states supporting the acts of third parties are not necessarily
responsible for those acts merely by providing financial, political, or intelligence
support.75  Only direct military support would qualify as an act of war under this
view.76
Viewing the situation pragmatically, it may not matter whether the initial attacks
were perpetrated by state actors or a criminal enterprise.  The existence of an armed
conflict is effectively determined by the behavior of sovereign states.77  One
international legal writer has concluded that a “state of generalized hostilities”
accurately characterizes state practice regarding application of the law of war, raising
the issue of the status of non-parties to the conflict as neutrals.78  Under this view, a
factual determination of whether the fighting is persistent enough or of a sufficient
magnitude to rise to the level of “armed conflict” in the view of the international
community would suffice to settle the issue.79
The present conflict does not fit squarely within the definitions of internal or
international armed conflicts.  The attacks on New York, Pennsylvania, and the
Pentagon do not appear to have been part of an effort to take control of territory or
install a new government, nor is it certain that they were carried out under the
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direction of another state.  However, the sophisticated planning and execution
believed necessary to have accomplished the attacks suggest that they were carried
out by organized members of a quasi-military force.80  The political and ideological
purpose ostensibly motivating the terrorist attacks arguably distinguishes them from
“ordinary” criminal acts of violence. The magnitude of harm combined with the threat
of more attacks appear to be considered sufficient to give rise to a right of self-
defense, not only in the viewpoint of the United States, but by many other states and
the United Nations.81  If the attacks are viewed as the opening volley to the United
States’ military response in Afghanistan, and the reactions of other nations are taken
into account, an armed conflict in the “factual sense” could be said to exist.
Are the September Attacks “Acts of War”?
The term “act of war” may be defined as “a measure of force which one party,
using military instruments of power, implements against another party in an
international armed conflict.”82  Another definition is a “use of force or other action
by one state against another” which “[t]he state acted against recognizes ... as an act
of war, either by use of retaliatory force or a declaration of war.”83  The September
attacks were not “acts of war” in the traditional sense, because the perpetrators were
not overtly acting on behalf of a state and because they did not employ conventional
military weapons.84  However, the United States’ reaction to the attacks is likely to
be of greater significance than the technicalities for the purposes of applying the law
of war.85
Assuming the existence of an armed conflict, it is beyond question that the
September attacks were part of it.  Preparation for the attacks would also be covered,
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notwithstanding the fact that the hostilities had not yet technically begun.86  Recent
cases of mail containing anthrax spores delivered to government representatives as
well as civilians may also be “acts of war” if they were carried out as part of the same
terrorist campaign.  
To label the attacks as “acts of war” does not imply that they are lawful.87
Although the principles of the law of war leave a great deal of room for interpretation,
there can be little doubt, assuming such acts can be viewed as acts of war, that the
attacks of September 11 were not conducted in accordance with the law of war.  Even
if one considers the Pentagon to be a valid military target, the hijacking of a
commercial airliner is not a lawful means for attacking it.88 Acts of bioterrorism, too,
violate the law of war, regardless of the nature of the target.89
Are Terrorists “Belligerents”?
Assuming that the attacks may be considered acts of war, and that there is indeed
an ongoing armed conflict, the Hague and  Geneva Conventions come into play to
determine the rights and responsibilities of participants, or “belligerents.”  Members
of armed forces of a party to the conflict are classified as combatants unless they
belong to a small class of members excluded from participation in combat, such as
medical and religious personnel, who are designated as non-combatants.90  Other
officials may under some circumstances attain combatant status if so designated by
their state.91  All others are considered civilians, who are not ordinarily authorized to
take part in hostilities.92 If captured, combatants are entitled to POW status and may
not be criminally punished for acts of violence carried out lawfully in their role as
combatants.  Civilians who fall into enemy hands, however, may be punished as
CRS-15
93  See HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 68. 
94 See Travalio, supra note 68, at 185.
95 See id.
96 See GC III art. 85.
97 Id. Art. III
98 GC IV art. 71.
99 See FM 27-10 § 247(b) (interpreting GC IV art. 4).
100 See FM 27-10 § 248 (citing GC IV art. 5).
criminals for participating in military hostilities, even if that conduct would have been
legal for a combatant.93
A member of an irregular or voluntary military is covered only if he is
commanded by a person responsible for subordinates, he wears a fixed distinctive
emblem recognizable at a distance, he carries arms openly, and he conducts operations
in accordance with the laws and customs of war.94 Because terrorists do not follow
these rules, they are not covered under the Geneva Convention as POWs.95  It should
be noted that Protocol I art. 96 requires non-state belligerents, in order for their
members to be entitled to protected treatment under the Protocol, to file a declaration
with the Swiss Government accepting the obligations of the Protocol. 
If al Qaida can be viewed as an irregular army, then, no member of al Qaida
would be entitled to POW treatment.  On the other hand, if al Qaida is a political
organization, only members who engage in warlike activities are unlawful combatants.
Other members, as well as civilians who give them aid that doesn’t amount to direct
participation in hostilities, do not lose their status as civilians. Members of al Qaida
captured in Afghanistan  may be entitled to POW or civilian status, depending upon
the circumstances of their capture.  If they are members of the armed forces, they
must be treated as POWs, even if they are accused of previously violating the law of
war or carrying out a terrorist act.96  GC III requires that a POW who is not accused
individually of committing a crime be detained in accordance with appropriate
guarantees of rights and humane treatment.  POWs accused of a crime may be tried
and imprisoned in the same manner that a member of the armed forces of the detaining
power would be treated.97
A civilian member of al Qaida captured in Afghanistan without having
participated in the hostilities may be detained only in accordance with GC IV.  If that
individual is suspected of having committed a crime, he or she is entitled to a regular
trial.98  A civilian who has engaged in hostile or belligerent conduct is still a protected
person, although one not entitled to POW treatment.99  A civilian captured within the
United States who is “definitely suspected” of activities hostile to the national
security, such as sabotage and espionage,  is not entitled to claim such rights and
privileges under GC IV that would be “prejudicial to the security of the state.”100
However, such persons must nevertheless be treated with humanity and if subject to
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trial, “shall be granted the full rights and privileges of a protected person” under GC
IV.101
Legal Bases for Establishing Military Commission
United States law incorporates the international law of war.102  The United States
adheres to the law of war through incorporation of the customary rules and treaty
provisions into regulations of the armed forces.  The Law of Land Warfare, FM 27-10
may be viewed as an embodiment of the United States Army’s interpretation of the
law of war on land.  Although the manual is not considered binding upon courts and
tribunals interpreting the law of war, those provisions of the manual that are neither
statutes nor the text of treaties to which the United States is a party may be
considered as evidence of the custom and practice of the law of war.103
Military jurisdiction is recognized from two sources: “that branch of a country’s
municipal law which recognizes its military establishment” and “that which is derived
from international law, including the law of war.”104  The U.S. military exercises its
jurisdiction through the use of courts-martial, military commissions, provost courts,
and other military tribunals.105
A military commission consists of a panel of military officers convened by
military authority to try enemy belligerents on charges of a violation of the law of
war.106  It is distinct from a military court martial, which is a panel set up to try U.S.
servicemembers (and sometimes civilians accompanying the armed forces) for
violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.  U.S. servicemembers charged
with a war crime may be tried before court martial or in federal court.107
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President Bush’s order authorizing the use of military commissions for the trial
of terrorists cites the President’s authority under the Constitution as well as the laws
of the United States, including the congressional authorization to use  military force
in response to the September 11 attacks,108 as well as 10 U.S.C. §§ 821 and 836.
There is no express language in the Constitution and very little mention in the
legislative authorities cited that clearly authorizes military tribunals; however, there
is historical precedent that may form a basis for an interpretation of the authorities to
support the order.
The Constitution.
The Constitution empowers the Congress to declare war and “make rules
concerning captures on land and water,”109 to define and punish violations of the “Law
of Nations,”110 and to make regulations to govern the armed forces.111  The
Constitution further empowers the Congress to make all laws “necessary and proper”
for the execution of all powers under the Constitution.112  The Congress also has the
power to regulate the jurisdiction of the courts113 and to establish such inferior
tribunal as it deems necessary.114  
Generally, the power of the President to convene military commissions flows
from his authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and his responsibility
to execute the laws of the nation.115  Under the  Articles of War and subsequent
statute,116 the President has at least implicit authority to convene military commissions
to try offenses against the law of war.117 Articles 18 and 21 of the UCMJ recognize
the concurrent jurisdiction of military commissions to deal with “offenders or offenses
designated by statute or the law of war.”118  Statutory offenses for which a military
commission may be convened include only aiding the enemy, 10 U.S.C. § 904, and spying,
10 U.S.C. § 906.  Caselaw suggests that military commissions could try as enemy
belligerents those accused of committing war crimes even if they hold U.S.
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citizenship.119  Recognized hostilities with foreign enemies may qualify to invoke the
law of war even where no declared state of war exists.120
Congress has thus recognized the authority to convene military commissions,121
and has delegated to the President the authority to set their rules of procedure, both
trial and post-trial.122 Congress has not, however, provided a definition of the offenses
under the law of war over which a military commission might exercise its jurisdiction,
nor has it explicitly identified many statutory offenses for which the accused might be
tried by military commission.
Precedent .
Most of the United States’ experience with military commissions relates to
occupied territory or conditions of martial law. Although the current crisis does not
fit the typical circumstances associated with war crimes committed by otherwise
lawful combatants in obvious theaters of war, there is some precedent for convening
military commissions to try enemy belligerents for conspiring to commit violations of
the law of war outside of any recognized war zone.
War with Mexico.
The use of military commissions by the United States dates back at least until the
war with Mexico in the 1840's.  During the occupation of Mexico in 1847, General
Winfield Scott convened “councils of war” to try Mexican citizens accused of
violations of the law of war, such as committing guerrilla warfare or enticing
American soldiers to desert.123  Despite the lack of statutory authority, General Scott
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relied on his own power under the law of war as the occupier of territory to issue the
order.124
Civil War Cases.
In April 1863, Union Army General Order Number 100 declared that military
commissions could prosecute “cases which do not come within the Rules and Articles
of War, or the jurisdiction conferred by statute on courts-martial” by using the
common law of war.125  Military commissions tried more than 2,000 cases during the
war and reconstruction period.126  However, after the war, the courts limited the
jurisdiction to areas occupied by United States forces and governed by martial law127
and limited the jurisdiction to genuine violations of the law of war.128
After the outbreak of the Civil War, Congress enacted the Act of March 3, 1863,
relating to habeas corpus, and regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases
authorizing the suspension of habeas corpus during the Rebellion.129 The President
issued the following proclamation:
That during the existing insurrection, and as a necessary means for suppressing the
same, all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors, within the United States,
and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments resisting militia drafts, or guilty
of any disloyal practice, affording aid and comfort to rebels, against the authority
of the United States, shall be subject to martial law, and liable to trial and
punishment by courts martial or military commission.
Second. That the writ of habeas corpus is suspended in respect to all persons
arrested, or who now, or hereafter during the Rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any
fort, camp, arsenal, military prison, or other place of confinement, by any military
authority, or by the sentence of any court martial or military commission.130
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is to be hoped that the military authorities of this country will never refuse such a
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The government sought to prosecute members of a group called the Sons of
Liberty, an organized group of conspirators operating in Indiana who had allegedly
been hired by Confederate officials to destroy the North.131 The “Supreme Grand
Commander of the Sons of Liberty” was convicted by a military commission and
sought review by the Supreme Court, which held it had no constitutional or statutory
authority to review military commissions.132  However, his co-conspirator Lamdin P.
Milligan, who was convicted and sentenced to death on charges of conspiracy against
the government, giving aid and comfort to the enemy, inciting insurrection, disloyal
practices, and violation of the law of war, was granted his petition to the Court for
habeas corpus. The Supreme Court recognized military commission jurisdiction over
violations of “laws and usages of war,” but stated those laws and usages “...can never
be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the government, and
where the courts are open and their process unobstructed”133  The Supreme Court
explained its reasoning:
It will be borne in mind that this is not a question of the power to proclaim martial
law, when war exists in a community and the courts and civil authorities are
overthrown. Nor is it a question what rule a military commander, at the head of his
army, can impose on states in rebellion to cripple their resources and quell the
insurrection...Martial law cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity
must be actual and present; the invasion real, such as effectively closes the courts
and deposes the civil administration.134
However, in 1865 the Attorney General found that co-conspirators charged in
the assassination of President Lincoln could be tried by military commission, despite
the fact that the courts were operating in Washington, D.C.135  His opinion
emphasized the difference between “open and active participants” in war and “secret,
but active participants” in violation of the law of war.136
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demand, because there is no act of  Congress that authorizes it.  In time of war the law
and usage of war authorize it, and they are a part of the law of the land.
137 Mudd. v. Caldera, 134 F. Supp. 2d 138, 140 (2001).
138 Id.  at 146 (reading together Ex Parte Milligan and Ex Parte Quirin).
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One of the men tried was Dr. Samuel Mudd, sentenced to life in prison for aiding
and abetting after the fact the conspiracy by providing medical assistance, lodging,
and horses to John Wilkes Booth and a co-conspirator.137  Dr. Mudd later received
a full pardon for his work in battling yellow fever in the prison.  His great-grandson
filed an application with the Army Board for Correction of Military Records asserting
his great-grandfather was innocent of the charges and that the military commission
lacked jurisdiction to try a citizen of Maryland when the courts were fully functional.
The Board recommended the conviction be set aside, but the Secretary of Defense
denied the application.  The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
dismissed the appeal, finding that “if Dr. Samuel Mudd was charged with a law of war
violation, it was permissible for him to be tried before a military commission even
though he was a United States and Maryland citizen and the civilian courts were open
at the time of the trial.”138
Other Conflicts.
In 1864 the United States made a treaty with the Modoc Indians in which the
tribe agreed to remain on a reservation in the State of Oregon.  United States troops
were subsequently sent out to cause them to return to the reservation after they had
left it.  A conflict ensued, and soon thereafter the Indians allegedly murdered several
local citizens and their families. More fighting between the U.S. troops and the
Modoc Indians broke out.  The U.S. detachment sent forth several emissaries to
negotiate a peaceable conclusion.  During the negotiations, the Modocs
“treacherously assassinated” two negotiators and severely wounded the third. Captain
Jack, the leader of the Modoc tribe, was captured along with most of his tribe, and
the military sought the Attorney General’s opinion as to whether the accused might
be tried by military tribunal.  The Attorney General agreed that they should be tried
by the military commission, although he found that
It is difficult to define exactly the relations of the Indian tribes to the United States;
but as they have been recognized as independent communities for treaty-making
purposes, and as they frequently carry on organized and protracted wars, they may
properly, as it seems to me, be held subject to those rules of warfare which make
a negotiation for peace after hostilities possible, and which make perfidy like that
in question punishable by military authority.139
World War I.
President Wilson did not use military commissions during World War I to try
individuals for war crimes committed within the territory of the United States.
Military authorities sought to try Pable Waberski, a Russian national sent by the
CRS-22
140  Superceded by UCMJ article 106, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 906.
141  Trial of Spies by Military Tribunal, 31 Op. Atty Gen. 356; 1918 U.S. AG LEXIS 2
(1918) Section 1343 of the United States Revised Statutes and article 82 of the Articles of
War, which were practically identical in language and read as follows: 
All persons who, in time of war, or of rebellion against the supreme authority of the
United States, shall be found lurking or acting as spies, in or about any of the
fortifications, posts, quarters, or encampments of any of the armies of the United States,
or elsewhere, shall be triable by a general court-martial, or by a military commission,
and shall, on conviction thereof, suffer death.
142  See 31 Op. Atty Gen. 356; 1918 U.S. AG LEXIS 2 (1918) (citing article 29 of the Hague
Convention of 1917, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land). 
143 Id. at LEXIS *11-12.
Germans to “blow things up in the United States,” by military commission.  Waberski
was arrested upon crossing the border from Mexico into the United States and
charged with “lurking as a spy” under article 82 of the Articles of War.140  The
Attorney General opined in a letter to the President that the jurisdiction of the military
was improper, noting
He had not entered any camp, fortification or other military premises of the United
States.  He had not, so far as appears, been in Europe during the war, so had not
come through the fighting lines or field of military operations.  Martial law had not
been declared at Nogales or thereabouts nor anywhere in the United States, and the
regular federal civilian courts were functioning in that district and throughout the
United States with at least their normal efficiency.
The Attorney General cited Ex Parte Milligan for the proposition that offenses
committed outside of the field of military operations and by a person not a member
of the military where regular civilian courts were functioning were not subject to the
jurisdiction of a military tribunal.  The Attorney General therefore found that the
words “or elsewhere” in Article 82 of the Articles of War were not constitutional.141
The law of war, the opinion stated, defined a spy as 
[a] person who, without authority and secretly, or under a false pretext, contrives
to enter within the lines of an army for the purpose of obtaining material
information and communicating it to the enemy; or one who, being by authority
within the lines, attempts secretly to accomplish such purpose. 142
According to the Attorney General, Waberski, therefore, was not a spy
according to the laws of war and, if guilty of any criminal offense, was triable only by
the regular civilian criminal courts.  It seemed plain to the Attorney General that
“Congress can not constitutionally confer jurisdiction upon a military court to try and
sentence any man not a member of the military forces and not subject to the
jurisdiction of such court under the laws of war or martial law.”143  He explained to
the President:
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If he could constitutionally be tried by court-martial, then it would logically follow
that Congress could provide for the trial by military courts of any person, citizen
or alien, accused of espionage or any other type of war crime, no matter where
committed and no matter where such person be found and apprehended.144
In 1920, Congress reenacted Article of War 15 with the addition of the wording “by
statute or” before the words “by the law of war.”145  The words “or elsewhere” remain
in article 106 of the UCMJ.146
World War II.
The post-World War II response to war crimes included both national and
international military tribunals.  While the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal was the
most visible venue in the European theater, the number of national military tribunals
far exceeded the number of trials conducted in the international tribunals.147
The Supreme Court confirmed the authority of the President, under his power
as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and as delegated to him by Congress to
try accused war criminals in occupied territories even though hostilities had ceased.148
The Supreme Court granted habeas corpus review to General Tomoyuki Yamashita,
who had been sentenced by military commission to be hanged for atrocities committed
by troops under his command.  However, the Court declined to review the merits of
the case or the sufficiency of evidence.149  Yamashita argued, among other things, that
no charge was stated against him under the law of war, because the military command
did not allege that Yamashita committed or ordered the offenses of his troops against
the civilian population in the Philippines that formed the basis for the charges.  The
Supreme Court disagreed, noting he had been properly charged for his breach of duty
by failing to control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them
to commit the specified atrocities.150
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General Yamashita also argued that he was entitled to a trial using the same
procedures as would be applied in courts martial, according to article 63 of the
Geneva Convention of 1929.151  The Supreme Court interpreted article 63 as applying
only to offenses committed during captivity,152 and therefore declined to examine the
procedural rules applied by the  military commission.    
Less established was the authority to try enemy saboteurs caught within the
territory of the United States during war.  After eight Nazi saboteurs were caught by
the Coast Guard, the President issued a proclamation that all such enemy saboteurs
would be tried by military commission.153  The eight German saboteurs (one of whom
was purportedly a U.S. citizen) were tried by military commission for entering the
United States by submarine, shedding their military uniforms, and conspiring to use
explosives on unknown targets.  In the case of Ex Parte Quirin, the Supreme Court
denied their writs of habeas corpus, holding that trial by such a commission did not
offend the Constitution and was authorized by statute.
Despite the fact that  the civil courts were open and functioning normally, the
Court held that the charge made out a valid allegation of an offense against the law
of war for which the President was authorized to order trial by a military
commission.154  The Court also distinguished Milligan, noting that he had not been
a part of or associated with the armed forces of the enemy, and therefore was a non-
belligerent, not subject to the law of war.155  The Court did not explain where it would
draw the line:
We have no occasion now to define with meticulous care the ultimate boundaries
of the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try persons according to the law of war.
It is enough that petitioners here, upon the conceded facts, were plainly within
those boundaries, and were held in good faith for trial by military commission,
charged with being enemies who, with the purpose of destroying war materials and
utilities, entered, or after entry remained in, our territory without uniform – an
offense against the law of war.  We hold only that those particular acts constitute
an offense against the law of war which the Constitution authorizes to be tried by
military commission.156
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The Court declined to apply the language of the Articles of War to determine
whether the procedures comported with the statute, but the Justices were unable to
agree whether Congress had not meant to apply the Articles of War to military
commissions or whether the Articles could be interpreted to support the procedures
used.157  In 1945, President Roosevelt issued a new military order establishing rules
for convening military commissions to try enemy saboteurs, in which he clarified the
applicability of some of the Articles of War.158  There was no occasion to test the new
order, however.  When Congress incorporated the Articles of War into the UCMJ in
1950, it included Article of War 15, “Jurisdiction of courts martial not exclusive”, as
Article 21 of the UCMJ to “preserve existing Army and Air Force law which gives
concurrent jurisdiction to [other] military tribunals...”.159 
Other Rulings on Military Courts.
The Supreme Court has issued several more recent opinions limiting the
authority of military courts-martial to persons reached pursuant to constitutional
powers to regulate the armed forces.160  The Court held that an honorably discharged
former soldier could not be tried by court martial for a crime he allegedly committed
while stationed overseas.161  The Court also set aside the military conviction of a
civilian dependant of a servicemember stationed overseas for a capital crime, at least
during time of peace when the United States was not occupying the country in which
the crime took place.162  The Court extended that ruling to civilian dependants
overseas charged with noncapital crimes, voiding the conviction by court martial of
a military wife charged with involuntary manslaughter.163  The Court later ruled that
civilian employees could not be tried by court martial, even for crimes committed
overseas.164  While these more recent cases seem to demonstrate a trend toward
limiting the jurisdiction of military courts martial, they may have little bearing on the
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jurisdiction of military commissions to try enemy belligerents under the constitutional
war powers.  The validity of any military commissions that might be convened
pursuant to the President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001, therefore, will
likely depend in large part on whether the defendants are legitimately classified as
“enemy belligerents” and “unlawful combatants,” or whether they are merely alien
civilians.
Analysis of President’s Military Order
The Military Order issued by President Bush, and the circumstances under which
it was issued, differ substantially from the World War II precedent used in Quirin.
Perhaps the most obvious difference is that war had been formally declared by
Congress against foreign states.  It should be remembered that the law of war has
undergone significant changes since the Quirin case was decided, most notably with
the 1949 Geneva Conventions. While the importance of a formal declaration of war
has faded since World War II, the law regarding the treatment of enemy civilians and
combatants has progressed significantly.
 
Wartime Basis.
 President Roosevelt issued Proclamation 2561 under the caption “Denying
Certain Enemies Access to the Courts of the United States” on July 2, 1942,165 after
the capture of the eight Nazi saboteurs.  On that same day, the President issued a
Military Order appointing a commission of seven general officers to try the named
defendants for “offenses against the law of war and the Articles of War.”166  The order
cited the President’s authority as President and Commander in Chief, the Constitution
and statutes of the United States, and specifically Article of War 38.167
Proclamation 2561 does not mention Congress’ declaration of war against
Germany.  The findings state simply that the safety of the United States demands that
all enemies who enter U.S. territory “as part of an invasion or predatory incursion”
or have entered “to commit sabotage espionage or other hostile or warlike act”should
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be promptly tried in accordance with the law of war.  The “invasion” language
appears to be borrowed from the Alien Enemy Act, which states that during declared
war between the United States and any foreign nation or government, or when an
invasion is perpetrated by any foreign nation or government, and the President makes
a proclamation of the event, the President may “direct the conduct to be observed, on
the part of the United States toward the aliens who become ...  liable [as alien
enemies”]... 168 The use of this language suggests that Proclamation 2561 might have
been intended as a proclamation pursuant the Alien Enemy Act.  On the other hand,
a review of contemporaneous Presidential proclamations shows that President
Roosevelt ordinarily cited specific statutory authority to support actions taken.169
President Bush’s Military Order of November 13 relies in large part on the
congressional authorization to use force, which gives the President the authority to
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations or persons.170
The resolution does not address military tribunals explicitly, but could be interpreted
as a broad authorization to exercise the President’s power as Commander in Chief of
the Armed Forces to prosecute an armed conflict.171  The Congress stopped short of
declaring war, which would have automatically triggered a number of statutes,172
including the Alien Enemy Act.173  The President could invoke the Act by
proclamation  without a declaration of war if “a predatory incursion” has been
perpetrated by a hostile nation.  Since the current armed conflict does not involve a
hostile state as such, the Act is probably not applicable nor very practical, since it
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would only allow the President to direct the treatment of  “natives, citizens, denizens
or subjects” of the hostile state.174  
Jurisdiction.
While the 1942 proclamation defined the acts subject to prosecution by military
tribunal, the new order defines a class of non-citizens whose members are subject to
military trial upon the President’s determination.  The President must first determine
that the person is or ever has been associated with terrorist acts or organizations, and
that it is in the interest of national security to subject that person to the order.  The
President has complete discretion once those determinations are made. Alien terrorists
and violators of the law of war might not be subject to the order; citizen terrorists and
war criminals are never subject to the order.175
Proclamation 2561 pertained to “subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at
war with the United States or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any
such nation” who are accused of certain offenses. Thus, U.S. citizens who acted as
enemy agents were covered by the proclamation.176 However, violators of the law of
war outside the territory of the United States, or those who entered the United States
lawfully, fell outside the language of the Proclamation.177
The M.O. of November 13 applies only to non-citizens.  It should be noted that
aliens, even those lawfully admitted to the country, do not necessarily enjoy the same
constitutional rights as citizens with regard to freedom from unreasonable seizures of
their persons.  During time of war, aliens who are citizens of hostile nations may be
summarily detained and deported,   and their property may be confiscated under the
Alien Enemy Act.178  They may also be denied access to the courts of the United
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States if they would use the courts to the advantage of the enemy or to impede the
U.S. prosecution of a war.179
Even during times of peace, nonimmigrant aliens may be subjected to different
treatment based on their nationality.180  In deportation proceedings, deportable aliens
probably have no constitutional right protecting them from selective deportation181
and the First Amendment does not provide protection against removal based on
association.182  Aliens who have entered the country and established a connection to
it, however, are protected by the Constitution, though their rights may differ from
those of citizens.  In criminal proceedings, such aliens receive full due process under
the Constitution.  Whether certain non-enemy aliens may be subjected to criminal
punishment or detained indefinitely for their suspected association with terrorist
groups is uncertain.183
Offenses Triable by Military Commission.
10 U.S.C. § 821 allows concurrent jurisdiction between courts martial and
military commissions for cases that by statute or by the law of war are triable by
military commission.  Military commissions trying enemy belligerents for war crimes
apply directly the international law of war, without recourse to domestic criminal
statutes unless such statutes are declaratory of international law.184 
Proclamation 2561 limited the predicate offenses to entering  the United States
surreptitiously during war and “committing or attempting or preparing to commit
sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law of war.”185  The
proclamation did not contain any definitions of the offenses.  The eight saboteurs were
charged with violations of the law of war and articles 81 and 82 of the Articles of
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War, as well as conspiracy to commit the foregoing.186  Therefore, the possibility that
the language “hostile or warlike acts” was meant to include offenses that were not
already included in the term “violation of the law of war,” possibly causing the
proclamation to exceed the statutory limit on jurisdiction, was not addressed.
President Bush’s M.O. is ambiguous as to which offenses may be tried by
military commissions.   While the President’s authority to try as saboteurs those
responsible for the September 11 attacks appears to be supported by precedent,187 the
M.O. could be construed as a grant of authority to detain and perhaps try persons not
suspected of direct participation or complicity in those attacks. The order allows the
President to subject a non-citizen to trial by military tribunal if he determines that
person is or was a member of al Qaida or committed, participated, aided and abetted,
or conspired in any terrorist act, even those unrelated to al Qaida’s campaign of terror
against the United States.  The order appears to apply to any act of terrorism during
the “relevant time” and anywhere in the world, so long as damage or injury to United
States persons was intended or caused.  The order may also include persons who are
protected under the Geneva Conventions and are entitled to due process in
accordance with international law.  A court could construe the order as incorporating
those standards in order to avoid conflict with U.S. treaty obligations.188   
Section 4 of the order provides that “[a]ny individual subject to this order shall,
when tried, be tried by military commission for any and all offenses triable by
military commission....” (Emphasis added).  This language could be construed as
impliedly limiting the offenses to those validly triable by military commission pursuant
to 10 U.S.C. § 36 under the relevant circumstances, which would sharply narrow the
scope of the order.  Such an interpretation would lead to the conclusion  that the
language in section 2 confines the offenses triable to only those war crimes that are
committed by non-citizens who fit the definition in section 2.  In other words, the
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189 See M.O. at § 2(e) (“... it is necessary for individuals subject to this order pursuant
to section 2 hereof to be detained, and, when tried, to be tried for violations of the
laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunals.”).
190  See Aldrich, supra note 71, at 8.  Persons detained as a security threat must be accorded
proper treatment according to their status under the Geneva Conventions.
191 18 USCS § 4001 (2001) provides:
No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except
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offenses in section 2 are not necessarily the offenses for which the defendant will be
tried, but rather, are to be used by the President to determine whether an individual
may be subject the order.  Violations of the law of war by others could still be tried
by military commission, but such a commission need not comply with the M.O. of
November 13.
If the order is interpreted to be consistent with the congressional authorization
for the use of force and 10 U.S.C. § 821, incorporating by reference the law of war,
the order would not permit the trial of individuals for terrorist acts unless the acts
occurred as part of the present armed conflict (including preparation therefor) and
they are violations of the law of war.  Therefore, the language “at the relevant time”
in Section 2(a)(1) should probably be construed to mean during and related to the
present armed conflict with terrorist forces emanating from Afghanistan.  
Authority to Detain.
The President’s order could be construed to authorize detention of persons for
violations of statutes not expressly triable by military commission, based solely on a
determination that the accused belongs to the class of persons subject to the order.
Some language in the order could be construed to authorize detention of such persons
even though they are not charged with any crime at all.189 
The authority to detain suspected war criminals is arguably implicit in the power
to authorize their trial by military commission.  Unless the authority is an inherent
power of the Executive, it must flow either from statute or from the law of war.
Although the language of the order could be construed to allow the indefinite
detention of persons subject to the order without any charge, an interpretation that
incorporates the authority it cites would lead to a different conclusion.  The order
could not consistently with 10 U.S.C. § 821 authorize detention of persons who are
neither unlawful combatants accused of violating the law of war nor persons accused
of violating 10 U.S.C. §§ 904 or 906.
The law of war does not permit punishment of enemy civilians, non-combatants,
or combatants (even unlawful ones) for crimes for which they bear no individual
responsibility.190  Therefore, their detention is likewise not authorized except as
provided for by statute or convention.  It might be argued that Congress implicitly
allows the President to detain non-citizens without explicit statutory authority,
because the President is expressly prohibited by statute from detaining citizens except
in accordance with statute.191  However, in this case such an argument may be less
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pursuant to an Act of Congress. 
192 P.L. 107-56 § 412 provides:
The Attorney General shall place an alien detained under paragraph (1) in removal
proceedings, or shall charge the alien with a criminal offense, not later than 7 days after
the commencement of such detention. If the requirement of the preceding sentence is not
satisfied, the Attorney General shall release the alien.
193  See M.O. at section 7(b)(1) (“military tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction with
respect to offenses by the individual” subject to the order).
194  10 U.S.C. § 821. See also Newton, supra note 86, at 21(arguing that “the entire scope of
history and American jurisprudence compel the conclusion that Article 21 grants jurisdiction
only over violations of the international laws of war.”).
persuasive because Congress, in enacting the USA PATRIOT Act, placed express
limits on the authority of the President to detain aliens for national security
purposes.192  It is arguably insufficient for the President to issue a determination that
an alien is subject to the order, unless the determination also contains an allegation
that the detainee has committed a violation of the law of war.  The interpretation of
international law regarding responsibility for the acts of others through indirect
participation may be necessary to justify detention of any alien suspected of conspiring
with or aiding terrorists in ways that fall short of violating the law of war as an
unlawful belligerent.
Jurisdiction of Other Courts.
A feature of the November 13 M.O. not apparent in the Proclamation or Military
Orders issued by President Roosevelt is language that appears to divest the federal
and state courts of jurisdiction over any offense committed by a person subject to the
order.193  Indeed, the order appears to strip the jurisdiction of foreign courts and
international tribunals to hear appeals, even indirect appeals, of persons detained or
convicted under the order. (Section 7b(2)ii-iii). 
To the extent that the order would affect the jurisdiction of state and federal
courts over crimes, especially those not triable by military tribunal under statute or the
common law of war, it may be judged to be overbroad. Congress’ acknowledgment
of concurrent jurisdiction over certain crimes to courts martial and military
commissions does not imply that the President has the power to create exclusive
jurisdiction in the military tribunals for offenses that might by statute be tried in
another court.  The President would not seem to have the constitutional authority to
regulate the jurisdiction of courts or convene inferior tribunals unless so authorized
by act of Congress. Article 21 of the UCMJ recognizes the military commissions’
jurisdiction to try only “offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may
be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.”194
Therefore, references to “offenses” and “crimes” in the order most likely must be
understood to refer to “offenses against the law of war” and “war crimes,” or to those
offenses mentioned expressly by statute as triable by military commission.  
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195  Ex Parte Quirin at 24-25 (... there is ... nothing in the Proclamation to preclude access to
the courts for determining its applicability to the particular case”).
196  Id.; Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429 (1956); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). But
see Eisentrager v. Johnson, 339 U.S. 763, 777-781 (1950)(enemy alien captured overseas in
territory not occupied by U.S. forces not entitled to habeas corpus). 
197  In his Military Order of January 11, 1945, President Roosevelt reissued the authorization
for military commissions without the language denying offenders access to courts.  See
Military Order of January 11, 1945, 10 Fed. Reg. 549 (Jan. 16, 1945) (reprinted at Appendix
B).
198  See Ex Parte Quirin at 25.
199  See id.; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946).
200  See In re Yamashita at 8.
201  See GC III art. 78.
202  See id.; United States v. Noriega, 808 F.Supp. 791, 796-797 (1992) (interpreting GC III
arts. 5, 7, 78, and 85 to accord General Noriega right to protest treatment in prison).
Review and Appeal.
Like FDR’s Proclamation, the Bush M.O. directs that “individuals prosecuted
by military tribunal shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any
proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought
on the individual's behalf.”  The government argued unsuccessfully in the Quirin case
that this language deprived the Court of its opportunity to afford the petitioners a
hearing.195  In light of that decision, the order will not likely be interpreted to deprive
persons of their right to seek habeas corpus relief in federal court, if they would
ordinarily have such rights.196  It is unclear what avenue of redress other than a
petition to file a writ of  habeas corpus the order is meant to block.197  
If a court agrees to hear a petitioner’s habeas corpus challenge to a conviction
by military commission, it will not likely order the prisoner released or set aside the
verdict “without the clear conviction that [the detention and trial] are  in conflict with
the Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally enacted.”198  Such a hearing
would not inquire into the guilt or innocence of the prisoner,199 or question the
decision of the tribunal, but only whether the tribunal was lawfully convened to hear
the case.200  
The Bush M.O. also denies persons subjected to it the privilege of seeking any
remedy in foreign courts or international tribunals. While the language would have no
internationally recognized effect on the jurisdiction of foreign courts or international
tribunals, it could be interpreted to revoke rights detainees would have under
international law, including treaties to which the United States is a party. For example,
a detainee claiming POW status has the right under GC III to protest perceived
violations of his rights to the Detaining Power, the Protecting Power, and to
humanitarian organization.201  This right may not be denounced by the POW, nor may
it be revoked or unnecessarily limited by the Detaining Power.202  A court or federal
agency may interpret the language of the order as an indication that the President
wishes to supercede parts of the Geneva Conventions, possibly binding the courts and
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203  In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
204  10 U.S.C. § 847.
205  10 U.S.C. § 848 provides for 30 days’ confinement or a fine of $100, or both, for any
person who disturbs the proceedings. 
206  10 U.S.C. § 849.  Such evidence is inadmissible in a capital case in a court-martial
proceeding.
207  10 U.S.C. § 850.
208 18 U.S.C. § 3172.
209 18 U.S.C. § 3156.
210 5 U.S.C. § 551 exempts courts martial and military commissions as well as “military
authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory.”  5 U.S.C. § 701,
Judicial Review, also excludes these entities from the definition of “agency.”
211  See, e.g.,  5 U.S.C. §§ 552 et seq.(FOIA).
212  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq.
213  10 U.S.C. § 836.
214  But see In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 19 (1946) (finding Articles of War 25 and 38
inapplicable to trial of enemy belligerent, despite express mention of military commissions and
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federal agencies to disregard decisions of an international tribunal or efforts to
intervene on the prisoner’s behalf by his state of nationality or an international
humanitarian organization.
Rules Applicable to the Military Commission
Statutes.
The Supreme Court has construed the UCMJ as broadly delegating  power to
the President.  This authority may be further delegated to a field commander or any
other commander with the power to convene a general court-martial.203 Statutes
authorize prosecuting persons for failure to appear as witness,204 punishing
contempt,205 and accepting into evidence certain depositions206 and records of courts
of inquiry.207  The proceeding is exempt from statutory requirements in other court
proceedings for a speedy trial.208  The rules pertaining to release and detention
pending certain judicial proceedings likewise do not apply.209  Military commissions
are also excluded from the definition of “agency” in title 5,210 which exempts them
from, among other things, responding to requests for information under the Freedom
of Information Act211 and challenges under the Administrative Procedures Act.212
While the President may set the rules of procedure and evidence for military
tribunals and need only apply “the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district court” where he
considers it practicable to do so, he may not apply rules contrary to or inconsistent
with the UCMJ.213  Where Congress has included military commissions in parts of the




215  10 U.S.C. § 849.
216  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38; see also Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,
53-54 (1989); Audrey I. Benison, International Criminal Tribunals: Is There a Substantive
Limitation on the Treaty Power?, 37 STAN. J INT’L L. 75, 99 (2001).   The same is true for
a military court-martial conducted under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866) (noting a servicemember “surrenders his right to
be tried by the civil courts”).  
217  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45 (1942).
218  Weiss v.United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994) (rejecting challenge to the military justice
system based on the fact that military judges are not “appointed” by the President within the
meaning of Article II of the Constitution, and the judges are not appointed to fixed terms of
office).
219 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866).
220  Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (holding there is no right to counsel under U.S.
Const. amends. V or VI in summary courts-martial).
221  Weiss at 178 (holding procedures established by Congress to govern military justice to be
adequate to ensure a fair trial consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment).
222  10 U.S.C. § 836 provides:
(a) Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cases arising
under this chapter [10 USCS §§ 801 et seq.] triable in courts-martial, military commissions
and other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry, may be prescribed by the
President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles
of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the
United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this
chapter [10 USCS §§ 801 et seq.]
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taking and use of depositions, for example, must adhere to the provisions of Article
49 of the UCMJ.215
Procedural Rules.
As a non-Article III court, a military commission would not be subject to the
same constitutional requirements that apply to Article III courts.216 Defendants
properly before a military commission, like defendants before a court-martial, would
likely have no right to demand a jury trial217 before a court established in accordance
with rules governing the judiciary.218 There is no right of indictment or presentment
under the Fifth Amendment,219 and there may be no protection against self-
incrimination or right to counsel.220 While Congress has enacted procedures applicable
to courts-martial that ensure basic due process rights,221 no such statutory procedures
exist to define due process rights for defendants before military commissions.
Procedural rules and evidentiary rules are prescribed by the President and may
differ among commissions.222 Courts-martial are conducted using the Military Rules
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222(...continued)
(b) All rules and regulations made under this article shall be uniform insofar as
practicable. 
223 Exec. Order 12,473, 49 Fed. Reg. 17, 152 (1984). These rules essentially mirror the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See Everett & Silliman, supra note 116, at 517. 
224  In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 20.  See Everett & Silliman, supra note 116, at 513.
225 The evidentiary rules in Yamashita included:  
16. Evidence. – a. The commission shall admit such evidence as in its opinion would be
of assistance in proving or disproving the charge, or such as in the commission’s opinion
would have probative value in the mind of a reasonable man.  In particular, and without
limiting in any way the scope of the foregoing general rules, the following evidence may
be admitted:
(1) Any document which appears to the commission to have been signed or issued
officially by any officer, department, agency, or member of the armed forces of any
government, without proof of the signature or of the issuance of the document.
(2) Any report which appears to the commission to have been signed or issued by the
International Red Cross or a member thereof, or by a medical doctor or any medical
service personnel, or by an investigator or intelligence officer, or by any other person
whom the commission finds to have been acting in the course of his duty when making
the report.
(3) Affidavits, depositions, or other statements taken by an officer detailed for that
purpose by military authority.
(4) Any diary, letter or other document appearing to the commission to contain
information relating to the charge.
(5) A copy of any document or other secondary evidence of its contents, if the
commission believes that the original is not available or cannot be produced without
undue delay. ...”
  Justice Murphy went on to note:
 Section 16, as will be noted, permits reception of documents, reports, affidavits,
depositions, diaries, letters, copies of documents or other secondary evidence of
their contents, hearsay, opinion evidence and conclusions, in fact of anything
which in the commission’s opinion “would be of assistance in proving or
disproving the charge,” without any of the usual modes of authentication.  A more
complete abrogation of customary safeguards relating to the proof, whether in the
usual rules of evidence or any reasonable substitute and whether for use in the trial
of crime in the civil courts or military tribunals, hardly could have been made.  So
far as the admissibility and probative value of evidence was concerned, the
directive made the commission a law unto itself.
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 49 (Murphy, J. dissenting).
of Evidence set out in the Manual for Courts-Martial;223 however, these rules need not
apply to trials by military commission.224  Subject to the statutory provisions above,
the President may establish any rules of procedure and evidence he deems
appropriate.225 
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military commission in Ex parte Quirin.  See Evan J. Wallach, The Procedural And
Evidentiary Rules of the Post-World War II War Crimes Trials: Did They Provide An
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the London Agreement of August  8, 1945, by the Allies setting trial procedures for German
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trials were, in turn, largely modeled after American military commissions.  See id. at 851.
229  See Major Marsha V. Mills, War Crimes in the 21st Century, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y
SYMP. 47, 55-56 (1999)(describing due process and evidentiary rules of the tribunals).
230 See, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Selected Legal and
Constitutional Issues, CRS Report, RL30091 (Feb. 22, 1999). 
231 See Wallach, supra note 226, at 860.
232 See id. at 871-72.
Due Process – Search for an International Standard.
Although there may be little judicial review available to persons convicted by
U.S. military commissions, it would seem  necessary to provide for trials that will be
seen as fundamentally fair under both U.S. and international standards regarding the
application of the law of war.226  Telford Taylor noted in evaluating World War II war
crimes trials:
It is of the first importance that the task of planning and developing permanent
judicial machinery for the interpretation and application of international penal law
be tackled immediately and effectively. The war crimes trials, at least in Western
Europe, have been held on the basis that the law applied and enforced in these
trials is international law of general application which everyone in the world is
generally bound to observe. On no other basis can the trials be regarded as judicial
proceedings, as distinguished from political inquisitions.227
There is some historical precedent from which an international norm regarding
procedural rights for accused war criminals might be derived.  The Nuremberg
Tribunals provide a good starting point,228 as further refined by the International
Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda.229 Perhaps the most recent
embodiment of the requirements of the international law of war is to be found in the
procedures of the not-yet-operational International Criminal Court established by the
Rome Statute.230
The evidentiary rules used at Nuremberg and adopted by the Tokyo tribunals
were designed to be non-technical, allowing the expeditious admission of “all evidence
[the Tribunal] deems to have probative value.”231  This evidence included hearsay,
coerced confessions, and the findings of prior mass trials.232 While the historical
consensus seems to have accepted that the war crimes commissions were conducted
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234  See Wallach, supra note 226, at 869; Application of Homma, 327 U.S. 759, 760 (1946)
(Murphy, J. dissenting).  But see Jonathan A. Bush, Lex Americana: Constitutional Due
Process and the Nuremberg Defendants, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 515, 526 (2001)(arguing that
in many ways, “the new [Tokyo and Nuremberg] tribunals’ charters gave defendants many
rights that went beyond anything allowed in the American system” at the time of the trials).
fairly,233 some observers argue that the malleability of the rules of procedure and
evidence could and did have some unjust results.234
Protocol I to the Geneva Convention provides, in article 75, a list of basic
guarantees that may be viewed as a baseline for an international standard of due
process:
Article 75.-Fundamental guarantees
1. In so far as they are affected by a situation referred to in Article 1 of this Protocol,
persons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from
more favorable treatment under the Conventions or under this Protocol shall be
treated humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy, as a minimum, the protection
provided by this Article without any adverse distinction based upon race, color, sex,
language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth,
birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria. Each Party shall respect the
person, honor, convictions and religious practices of all such persons. 
2. The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by military agents: 
(a) Violence to the life, health, or physical or mental well-being of persons, in
particular: 
(i) Murder; 
(ii) Torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental; 
(iii) Corporal punishment ; and 
(iv) Mutilation; 
(b) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment,
enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; 
(c) The taking of hostages; 
(d) Collective punishments; and 
(e) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts. 
3. Any person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the armed conflict
shall be informed promptly, in a language he understands, of the reasons why these
measures have been taken. Except in cases of arrest or detention for penal offences,
such persons shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in any event as
soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or internment have ceased
to exist. 
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4. No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a person found
guilty of a penal offence related to the armed conflict except pursuant to a conviction
pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the generally
recognized principles of regular judicial procedure, which include the following: 
(a) The procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay of the
particulars of the offence alleged against him and shall afford the accused before and
during his trial all necessary rights and means of defense; 
(b) No one shall be convicted of an offense except on the basis of individual penal
responsibility;
(c) No one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account of any act
or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under the national or
international law to which he was subject at the time when it was committed; nor shall
a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time when the
criminal offence was committed; if, after the commission of the offence, provision is
made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby;
(d) Anyone charged with an offense is presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law; 
(e) Anyone charged with an offense shall have the right to be tried in his presence; 
(f) No one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt; 
(g) Anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to examine, or have
examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; 
(h) No one shall be prosecuted or punished by the same Party for an offence in respect
of which a final judgement acquitting or convicting that person has been previously
pronounced under the same law and judicial procedure; 
(i) Anyone prosecuted for an offence shall have the right to have the judgement
pronounced publicly; and 
(i) A convicted person shall be advised on conviction of his judicial and other
remedies and of the time-limits within which they may be exercised. 
5. Women whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to the armed conflict
shall be held in quarters separated from men's quarters. They shall be under the
immediate supervision of women. Nevertheless, in cases where families are detained
or interned, they shall, whenever possible, be held in the same place and
accommodated as family units. 
6. Persons who are arrested, detained or interned for reasons related to the armed
conflict shall enjoy the protection provided by this Article until their final release,
repatriation or re-establishment, even after the end of the armed conflict. 
7. In order to avoid any doubt concerning the prosecution and trial of persons accused
of war crimes or crimes against humanity, the following principles shall apply: 
(a) Persons who are accused of such crimes should be submitted for the purpose of
prosecution and trial in accordance with the applicable rules of international law; and
(b) Any such persons who do not benefit from more favorable treatment under the
Conventions or this Protocol shall be accorded the treatment provided by this Article,
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whether or not the crimes of which they are accused constitute grave breaches of the
Conventions or of this Protocol. 
8. No provision of this Article may be construed as limiting or infringing any other
more favorable provision granting greater protection, under any applicable rules of
international law, to persons covered by paragraph 1. 
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Appendix A
Military Order of November 13, 2001.
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism 
By the authority vested in me as President and as Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces of the United States by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution
(Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat. 224) and sections 821 and 836 of title 10, United
States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
Section 1.  Findings. 
(a)  International terrorists, including members of al Qaida, have carried out attacks
on United States diplomatic and military personnel and facilities abroad and on
citizens and property within the United States on a scale that has created a state of
armed conflict that requires the use of the United States Armed Forces. 
(b)  In light of grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism, including the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001, on the headquarters of the United States Department
of Defense in the national capital region, on the World Trade Center in New York,
and on civilian aircraft such as in Pennsylvania, I proclaimed a national emergency on
September 14, 2001 (Proc. 7463, Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of
Certain Terrorist Attacks). 
(c)  Individuals acting alone and in concert involved in international terrorism possess
both the capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist attacks against the
United States that, if not detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths, mass
injuries, and massive destruction of property, and may place at risk the continuity of
the operations of the United States Government. 
(d)  The ability of the United States to protect the United States and its citizens, and
to help its allies and other cooperating nations protect their nations and their citizens,
from such further terrorist attacks depends in significant part upon using the United
States Armed Forces to identify terrorists and those who support them, to disrupt
their activities, and to eliminate their ability to conduct or support such attacks. 
(e)  To protect the United States and its citizens, and for the effective conduct of
military operations and prevention of terrorist attacks, it is necessary for individuals
subject to this order pursuant to section 2 hereof to be detained, and, when tried, to
be tried for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military
tribunals. 
(f)  Given the danger to the safety of the United States and the nature of international
terrorism, and to the extent provided by and under this order, I find consistent with
section 836 of title 10, United States Code, that it is not practicable to apply in
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military commissions under this order the principles of law and the rules of evidence
generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.
(g)  Having fully considered the magnitude of the potential deaths, injuries, and
property destruction that would result from potential acts of terrorism against the
United States, and the probability that such acts will occur, I have determined that an
extraordinary emergency exists for national defense purposes, that this emergency
constitutes an urgent and compelling government interest, and that issuance of this
order is necessary to meet the emergency. 
Sec. 2.  Definition and Policy. 
(a)  The term "individual subject to this order" shall mean any individual who is not
a United States citizen with respect to whom I determine from time to time in writing
that: 
(1)  there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times, 
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida; 
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international
terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have
as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens,
national security, foreign policy, or economy; or 
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in subparagraphs (i)
or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of this order; and 
(2)  it is in the interest of the United States that such individual be subject to this
order. 
(b)  It is the policy of the United States that the Secretary of Defense shall take all
necessary measures to ensure that any individual subject to this order is detained in
accordance with section 3, and, if the individual is to be tried, that such individual is
tried only in accordance with section 4. 
(c)  It is further the policy of the United States that any individual subject to this order
who is not already under the control of the Secretary of Defense but who is under the
control of any other officer or agent of the United States or any State shall, upon
delivery of a copy of such written determination to such officer or agent, forthwith
be placed under the control of the Secretary of Defense. 
Sec. 3.  Detention Authority of the Secretary of Defense.  
Any individual subject to this order shall be -- 
(a)  detained at an appropriate location designated by the Secretary of Defense outside
or within the United States; 
(b)  treated humanely, without any adverse distinction based on race, color, religion,
gender, birth, wealth, or any similar criteria; 
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(c)  afforded adequate food, drinking water, shelter, clothing, and medical treatment;
(d)  allowed the free exercise of religion consistent with the requirements of such
detention; and 
(e)  detained in accordance with such other conditions as the Secretary of Defense
may prescribe. 
Sec. 4.  Authority of the Secretary of Defense Regarding Trials of Individuals
Subject to this Order. 
(a)  Any individual subject to this order shall, when tried, be tried by military
commission for any and all offenses triable by military commission that such individual
is alleged to have committed, and may be punished in accordance with the penalties
provided under applicable law, including life imprisonment or death. 
(b)  As a military function and in light of the findings in section 1, including subsection
(f) thereof, the Secretary of Defense shall issue such orders and regulations, including
orders for the appointment of one or more military commissions, as may be necessary
to carry out subsection (a) of this section. 
(c)  Orders and regulations issued under subsection (b) of this section shall include,
but not be limited to, rules for the conduct of the proceedings of military
commissions, including pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, modes of proof,
issuance of process, and qualifications of attorneys, which shall at a minimum provide
for -- 
(1)  military commissions to sit at any time and any place, consistent with such
guidance regarding time and place as the Secretary of Defense may provide; 
(2)  a full and fair trial, with the military commission sitting as the triers of both fact
and law; 
(3)  admission of such evidence as would, in the opinion of the presiding officer of the
military commission (or instead, if any other member of the commission so requests
at the time the presiding officer renders that opinion, the opinion of the commission
rendered at that time by a majority of the commission), have probative value to a
reasonable person; 
(4)  in a manner consistent with the protection of information classified or classifiable
under Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995, as amended, or any successor
Executive Order, protected by statute or rule from unauthorized disclosure, or
otherwise protected by law, (A) the handling of, admission into evidence of, and
access to materials and information, and (B) the conduct, closure of, and access to
proceedings; 
(5)  conduct of the prosecution by one or more attorneys designated by the Secretary
of Defense and conduct of the defense by attorneys for the individual subject to this
order; 
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(6)  conviction only upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the
commission present at the time of the vote, a majority being present; 
(7)  sentencing only upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the
commission present at the time of the vote, a majority being present; and 
(8)  submission of the record of the trial, including any conviction or sentence, for
review and final decision by me or by the Secretary of Defense if so designated by me
for that purpose. 
Sec. 5.  Obligation of Other Agencies to Assist the Secretary of Defense. 
Departments, agencies, entities, and officers of the United States shall, to the
maximum extent permitted by law, provide to the Secretary of Defense such
assistance as he may request to implement this order. 
Sec. 6.  Additional Authorities of the Secretary of Defense. 
(a)  As a military function and in light of the findings in section 1, the Secretary of
Defense shall issue such orders and regulations as may be necessary to carry out any
of the provisions of this order. 
(b)  The Secretary of Defense may perform any of his functions or duties, and may
exercise any of the powers provided to him under this order (other than under section
4(c)(8) hereof) in accordance with section 113(d) of title 10, United States Code. 
Sec. 7.  Relationship to Other Law and Forums. 
(a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to -- 
(1)  authorize the disclosure of state secrets to any person not otherwise authorized
to have access to them; 
(2)  limit the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
or the power of the President to grant reprieves and pardons; or 
(3)  limit the lawful authority of the Secretary of Defense, any military commander,
or any other officer or agent of the United States or of any State to detain or try any
person who is not an individual subject to this order. 
(b) With respect to any individual subject to this order -- 
(1) military tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offenses by the
individual; and 
(2) the individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any
proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought
on the individual's behalf, in (i) any 
court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation,
or (iii) any international tribunal. 
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(c)  This order is not intended to and does not create any right, benefit, or privilege,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by any party, against the
United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees,
or any other person. 
(d)  For purposes of this order, the term "State" includes any State, district, territory,
or possession of the United States.
(e)  I reserve the authority to direct the Secretary of Defense, at any time hereafter,
to transfer to a governmental authority control of any individual subject to this order.
Nothing in this order shall be construed to limit the authority of any such
governmental authority to prosecute any individual for whom control is transferred.
Sec. 8.  Publication. 
This order shall be published in the Federal Register. 
GEORGE W. BUSH 
THE WHITE HOUSE, 
November 13, 2001. 
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Appendix B
Proclamation   No. 2561.
DENYING CERTAIN ENEMIES ACCESS TO THE COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION
WHEREAS the safety of the United States demands that all enemies who have
entered upon the territory of the United States as part of an invasion or predatory
incursion, or who have entered in order to commit sabotage, espionage or other
hostile or warlike acts, should be promptly tried in accordance with the law of
war;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United
States of America and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes
of the United States, do hereby proclaim that all persons who are subjects, citizens
or residents of any nation at war with the United States or who give obedience to
or act under the direction of any such nation, and who during time of war enter or
attempt to enter the United States or any territory or possession thereof, through
coastal or boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or attempting or
preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of
the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military
tribunals; and that such persons shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or
maintain any proceeding directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or
proceeding sought on their behalf, in the courts of the United States, or of its
states, territories, and possessions, except under such regulations as the Attorney
General, with the approval of the Secretary of War, may from time to time
prescribe.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the United States of America to be affixed.
DONE at the City of Washington this 2d day of July, In the year of our
Lord nineteen hundred and forty-two, and of the Independence







Military Order of July 2, 1942.
APPOINTMENT OF A MILITARY COMMISSION
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President and as Commander in chief
of the Amy and Navy, under the Constitution and statutes of the United States,
and most particularly the Thirty-Eighth Article of War (U.S.C., title 10, sec.
1509), 1, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, do hereby appoint as a Military Commission
the following persons:
Major General Frank R. McCoy, President
Major General Walter S. Grant
Major General Blanton Winship
Major General Lorenzo D. Gasser
Brigadier General Guy V. Henry 
Brigadier General John T. Lewis 
Brigadier General John T. Kennedy
The prosecution shall be conducted by the Attorney General and the Judge
Advocate General. The defense counsel shall be Colonel Cassius M. Dowell and
Colonel Kenneth Royall.
The Military Commission shall meet in Washington, D. C., on July 8th, 1942, or
as soon thereafter as is practicable, to try for offenses against the law of war and
the Articles of War, the following persons:
Ernest Peter Burger 
George John Dasch 
Herbert Hans Haupt 
Henry Harm Heinck 
Edward John Kerling 
Hermann Otto Neubauer 
Richard Quirin 
Werner Thiel
The Commission shall have power to and shall, as occasion requires, make such
rules for the conduct of the proceeding, consistent with the powers of military
commissions under the Articles of War, as it shall deem necessary for a full and
fair trial of the matters before it. Such evidence shall be admitted as would, in the
opinion of the President of the Commission, have probative value to a reasonable
man. The concurrence of at least two-thirds of the members of the Commission
present shall be necessary for a conviction or sentence. The record of the trial,






Military Order of January 11, 1945.
GOVERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS
FOR THE TRIAL OF CERTAIN OFFENDERS AGAINST THE LAW OF WAR 
AND GOVERNING THE PROCEDURE FOR SUCH COMMISSIONS
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President and as Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy, under the Constitution and statutes of the United
States, and more particularly the Thirty-Eighth Article of War (10 U.S.C. 1509), it
is ordered as follows:
1. All persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war
with the United States or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any
such nation, and who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United
States or any territory or possession thereof, through coastal or boundary
defenses, and are charged with committing or attempting or preparing to commit
sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law of war, shall
be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals. The
commanding generals of the several service and defense commands in the
continental United States and Alaska, under the supervision of the Secretary of
War, are hereby empowered to appoint military commissions for the trial of such
persons.
2. Each military commission so established for the trial of such persons
shall have power to make and shall make, as occasion requires, such rules for the
conduct of its proceedings, consistent with the powers of military commissions
under the Articles of War, as it shall deem necessary for a full and fair trial of the
matters before it: Provided, that
(a) Such evidence shall be admitted as would, in the opinion of the
president of the commission, have probative value to a reasonable man;
(b) The concurrence of at least two-thirds of the members of the
commission present at the time the vote is taken shall be necessary for a conviction
or sentence;
(c) The provisions of Article 70 of the Articles of War, relating to
investigation and preliminary hearings, shall not be deemed to apply to the
proceedings;
(d) The record of the trial, including any judgment or sentence, shall
be promptly reviewed under the procedures established in Article 501/2 of the
Articles of War.
FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT
THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 11, 1945.
